The frequency of my reports on the Chinese Yuan is admittedly much higher than it used to be. Why? Call it disbelief. More than two months have passed since China revalued its currency, and after a rapid 1% appreciation, the RMB has actually fallen back. Today, it stands only .5% higher against the Dollar compared to June 18. On a trade-weighted basis, it is actually 2.3% lower. What is going on?!

It can foremost be attributed to a disconnect between Chinese words and Chinese action. While The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) purportedly supports a stronger, flexible Yuan (”Adopting a more flexible exchange-rate regime serves China’s long-term interests as the benefits…far exceed the cost in reorganising industries and removing outdated capacities.”), in practice, it has prevented the currency from budging. On numerous occasions since supposedly allowing the RMB to appreciate, it has intervened in the forex markets through various shadow dealers to prevent this very outcome.

In fact, China has increased its purchases of South Korean and Japanese sovereign debt, ostensibly as part of its diversification strategy, but more likely to put upward pressure on those currencies. “Data from Japan’s Ministry of Finance show that China bought a net 1.73 trillion yen ($20.3 billion) of Japanese government bonds in the first half of this year, compared with a net sale of 5.9 billion yen ($69 million) a year earlier. That strong demand has been a key factor strengthening the yen in recent weeks.” This could have broad implications, since in the last quarter, China accumulated $81 Billion in new forex reserves, and seems intent on further diversifying out of US Dollar-denominated assets.

China’s general obstinacy towards in dealing with the Yuan is baffling to market observers, especially given the trade surplus of nearly $30 Billion in June, its largest since January of 2009. In fact, China can be seen moving backwards. It recently inaugurated a pilot program that will allow exporters to hold offshore accounts of foreign currency, which might be expected to relieve some of the upward pressure on both the Yuan and on China’s foreign exchange reserves: “If you don’t force firms to surrender their foreign-exchange proceeds, then they won’t be exchanged for renminbi, which is a source of appreciation pressure.” In this way, China can both limit speculative capital inflows (even by domestic investors) and inflation.

Foreign governments, led by the US, are still threatening action. Senators and Congressmen continue to harp on the issue (it is election season, after all), and are still threatening to slap a tariff on all Chinese imports. However, their efforts are being undermined by both the Department of Treasury (which refuses to label China a “currency manipulator”) and the Department of Commerce, which recently determined that the application of a broad-based tariff on all Chinese imports would violate its mandate.

I have always been cynical about China’s forex policy, on the basis that it is self-interested and disingenuous, and I think the fact that it remains pegged to the USD confirms that sentiment. In the end, China won’t bow to international pressure. It will only allow the Yuan to appreciate after it has determined that its economy won’t be negatively impacted, and even then, the pace will be glacial.

With the onset of the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis this year, volatility levels in forex (as well as in other financial markets), surged to levels not seen since the height of the credit crisis. While volatility has subsided slightly over the last few months, it still remains above its average for the year, and significantly above levels of the last five years.

The spike in volatility was easy enough to understand. Basically, the possibility of a default by a member of the EU or even worse, a breakup of the Euro created massive uncertainty in the markets, spurring the flow of capital from regions and assets perceived as risky to those perceived as safe havens. As you can see from the chart below, this trend has begun to reverse itself, but still remains prone to sudden spikes.

While the crisis in the EU seems to have (temporarily) settled, investors are attuned to the possibility that it could flare up again at any moment. A failed bond issue, a higher-than-forecast budget deficit, political stalemate, labor strikes – all signal a failure to resolve the crisis, and would surely trigger a renewed upswing in volatility and sell-off in risky assets.

The same goes for (unforeseen) crises in other regions, affecting other currencies. Muses one analyst: “Next week? Who knows. One strong candidate is for flight out of the yen as investors start to fear there won’t be enough domestic demand for mountains of Japanese debt and foreign buyers will insist on much higher yields. Another might be that Swiss banking exposure to insolvent east European households causes another banking crisis.” Don’t forget about the UK and US, both of which have hardly put the recession behind them, and whose Trillions in debt represent powder kegs waiting to explode.

It will be months or years before these latent crises even begin to manifest themselves, let alone achieve some kind of resolution. As a result, many analysts predict that volatility will remain high for the foreseeable future: “Big and sudden currency market moves shouldn’t come as a surprise, whatever the direction…Higher market volatility should follow on from greater macroeconomic volatility. Increased economic fluctuations increase uncertainty. And there’s no question macroeconomic volatility has risen.”

In addition, there is no way for governments for Central Banks to alleviate these crises due to the “Trillema of International Finance.” Greg Mankiw, Harvard Economics Professors, explains that in prioritizing an independent monetary policy and open capital markets have forced many countries to forgo exchange rate stability: “Any American can easily invest abroad…and foreigners are free to buy stocks and bonds on domestic exchanges. Moreover, the Federal Reserve sets monetary policy to try to maintain full employment and price stability. But a result of this decision is volatility in the value of the dollar in foreign exchange markets.” While the Euro has eliminated exchange rate fluctuations between members of the Eurozone, meanwhile, there is nothing that the ECB can (or desires to) do to minimize volatility between the Euro and outside currencies.

From the standpoint of forex strategy, there are a couple of lessons that can be learned. First of all, the carry trade will remain underground until volatility returns to more attractive levels. Until then, the potential gains from earning a positive yield spread will be offset by the possibility of sudden, irascible currency depreciation. Second, growth currencies – despite boasting strong fundamentals – will remain vulnerable to sudden declines. That doesn’t mean that they should be avoided; rather, you should simply be aware that small corrections could easily turn into multi-month weakness.

The fiscal crisis ravaging the Euro and the Pound has sent the Dollar skyward. On the one hand, the prospect of continued uncertainty and dissolution of the Euro would seem to be an excellent harbinger for continued appreciation in the Dollar. On the other hand, it should only be a matter of time before investors recognize that the Dollar’s fiscal fundamentals are also quite weak.

Unlike during the last few years, analysts are no longer talking about (forex reserve) diversification. It was once widely predicted that the Euro would rival the Dollar for a place in the portfolios of foreign Central Banks. As expected, preferences are now shifting back in favor of the Dollar and to a lesser extent, the Yen. The Pound and Swiss Franc may have a small role, as will the “New” Euro. Over the short-term, however, Central Banks (and investors) will continue to eschew the Euro, if only due to sheer uncertainty.

Given that everything is relative in forex, investors and Central Banks only have so many options when it comes to choosing which currencies in which to denominate their portfolios. Thus, it’s understandable that a sudden crisis in the EU would buoy the Dollar. At the same time, it’s not exactly a good bet that the US isn’t destined to suffer a similar fate.

Due to extremely low short-term interest rates, most investors have been willing to accept low returns when lending to the US (by buying Treasury Securities, and indirectly by simply holding Dollars). At some point, both short-term interest rates and the rate of inflation will rise, and investors will have to re-examine their risk/reward schemes. My suspicion is that investors will demand higher yields in exchange for lending to the US.

Just like with Greece, a US fiscal crisis would probably emerge suddenly. While the US government pays lip service to the notion of balancing its budget and reducing its sovereign debt, even the most optimistic projections show a budget deficit for the next 10 years. Beyond that, the retirement of the baby boom generation and their “entitlement” payment will make it nearly impossible for the US to operate a budget surplus.

In short, the only hope is for the US economy to grow faster than the national debt. If the US economy grows at 4% per year, for example, it will have to run a budget deficit less than 4% of GDP in order to reduce its relative level of debt. On the surface, this seems like a reasonable possibility, but given trends over the last three decades (covering periods of both recession and economic boom), it doesn’t seem likely.

This is not new information. Doomsday theorists have been predicting the bankruptcy of the US for two centuries. Don’t mistake me for doing the same. Rather, I only wish to point out how ironic it is that the Dollar’s fiscal conditions are comparable (and in some ways worse) than some of the problem countries that investors are currently focusing on.

Then again, forex is relative. Some analysts have suggested that the new reserve currency will be gold, oil, and other commodities. Unfortunately, there isn’t nearly enough (liquid) supply of these materials to occupy more than a small portion of reserves. Under the current system, then, investors are pretty much stuck with the Dollar. At this point, betting to the contrary is tantamount to betting on the complete collapse of the modern financial system. A reasonable bet, perhaps, but you can forgive investors for being hesitant to embrace it.

I have always wanted to write a post about seasonality, but whenever push came to shove, I couldn’t see the point. Besides, I was never sure whether seasonality falls into the scope of technical analysis or whether it made sense to consider in fundamental terms, and for fear of overstretching, I stayed away. Recently, I read a column by Kathy Lien about forex seasonality. In fact, this article was merely an updated version of a nearly identical article that she contributed earlier to Investopedia, but nonetheless I found it informative, and I was finally inspired to address the topic on the Forex Blog.

Basically, Lien’s analysis consisted of examining 10 years of data for a handful of major currency pairs, and picking out the month(s) for each pair in which performance tended to be most lopsided. (Since forex is zero-sum, it should be the case that over a long enough time horizon, the average fluctuation for every pair should sink to ~0%. For other types of securities/investments, this type of analysis might be less viable). She discovered that the USD has tended to rise against in the Yen in July, but to fall in August. Meanwhile, the Dollar has tended to rise against the Euro in January, and fall against the Canadian Dollar in May. A similar study by DailyFX found that the US Dollar has also tended to rise against the Dollars of Australian, New Zealand, and Canada in the month of July.

These numbers are certainly interesting. But, I want to offer a clarification that the authors, themselves, didn’t bother to make. Namely, when making statistical claims about trends, it’s important to perform statistical (and not just visual) analysis. For example, the fact that the authors based all of their conclusions on only 10 years of data means that the case for statistical significance (a mathematical concept which states that a certain result cannot be a product of pure chance) is not as strong as you would think. Given that major currencies have floated since 1973, there is at least 30 years of good data which can and should have been used in the analysis.

For example, Lien observed that the US Dollar rose 80% of the time against the Yen against in the month of July. Given that the sample size (10 years) is only a fraction of the total data (let’s assume 30 years), we can say with 95% confidence (in accordance with statistical theory) that the actual fluctuation is somewhere between 60% and 100%. If you want to be 99% sure, then the interval expands to 53 to 100. To be fair, most traders would be perfectly happy with 95% confidence, and in this case, that means we can be 95% sure that the Dollar will rise against the Yen at least 60% of the time in the month of July. That’s not great, but still better than a coin-toss. If you bet on this trend every July over the next 10 years, then, you can be 95% sure that you will come out ahead. However, the average return over the last 10 years for this particular trend is only .39%, or 4.8% on an annualized basis. That’s not that impressive considering the margin of error and the amount of work that you had to do.

As if this were not enough, Lien can’t even proffer an explanation why this is the case. (I’m certainly not blaming her; frankly I would be hard-pressed to come up with anything convincing). Being a fundamental analyst, personally, I like to have some idea (or delude myself into thinking I have some idea) as to why a certain trend exists, and I’m not content to simply take it as face value.  Thus, even if statistical theory tells me that this particular trend probably isn’t a product of pure chance, from where I’m sitting, it might as well be.

Actually, I was much more impressed with a similar piece of analysis that Lien published on FX 360, which looks at how volatility varies for USD/X currency pairs, from month-to-month. For all of the currency pairs that Lien examined, there is a clear pattern: volatility peaks in December/January and reaches a low in the summer. Not only is this trend clearly discernible, but also neatly explicable. In all of the financial markets, trading activity (and volatility, by extension) dries up in the summer as investors go on vacation. It slowly builds during the end of the year as portfolio managers churn their positions to try to meet their annual targets.

From a practical standpoint, there are a few takeaways. First, if you’re a carry trader, know that the risk is generally higher in the winter than in the summer. While many traders may complain about the lack of fluctuation in July and consequent difficulty of profitably day trading, you can sit back and earn a low-risk return on the interest rate spread.

With regard to the monthly trends for specific currency pairs that I referenced at the beginning of this post, I would say that they are certainly worth being aware of, especially if you’re a swing trader and tend to hold your positions for only a month. For shorter or longer-term trading, however, I don’t think most of these trends are actionable. Even in the handful of trends that seem to be bullet-proof, the fact that you must enter into the trade on the 1st of the month and exit on the last day of the month (since it’s on that basis that the trends were analyzed) would seem contrived and annoying.

I have to admit- I’m intensely curious as to whether anyone has actually tried to trade on such a strategy. Please share your experiences below!

With so much to think about these days, I havn’t spent much time poring over foreign exchange reserve statistics. Apparently, this is to my detriment, as there have been a number of important developments on this front, some of which carry far-reaching forex implications.

I’m guessing a lot of you are probably in the same boat as me, wondering why forex reserves are worth paying any attention to. While busy looking at complex charts and GDP/inflation statistics, however, we forget that a currency’s value is fundamentally determined by supply and demand. In other words, while bullish/bearish indicators and interest rates are the proximal factors behind forex, the supply/demand dynamic is the ultimate factor. And Central Banks, collectively, comprise one of the largest contingents behind this supply/demand.

As I was saying, this equilibrium is currently undergoing a seismic shift. Specifically, “The dollar’s share in official foreign exchange reserves in 140 countries has fallen to its lowest level since euro cash was introduced in 2002, according to the IMF.” The Euro, Yen, and “other currencies” (i.e. minor currencies that are collectively important but individually unimportant), meanwhile, have seen increased interest from Central Banks. This is consistent with another report I saw recently, enunciating that,”Global reserves probably gained by about $180 billion in the third quarter with U.S. dollar-denominated reserves accounting for about $50 billion or less than 30 percent.”

This came as a shock to many market observers, who assumed that many economies lacked either the capacity or the impetus to diversify their reserves, especially since many of them peg their currencies to the Dollar. These countries are savvier than they used to be, however: “Emerging market central banks are selling their local currencies and buying U.S. dollars to prevent appreciation of their currencies. They’re avoiding having a bigger concentration of U.S. dollars in their portfolio by turning around and selling dollars against the euro and other currencies.”

Even industrialized countries, whose forex reserves are dwarfed by their emerging market counterparts, are jumping into diversification. After a nearly 10-year hiatus, Canada will jump back into the forex reserve game, by $1 Billion in foreign currency bonds, denominated in Euros. According to one analyst, “This…should be viewed in the context of the entire developed world, which is in the process of generally ramping up the size of its foreign reserves, and subtly shifting away from USD.”

The wild card is China. I use the term wild card both because China’s forex reserves are the world’s largest (recently confirmed at $2.4 Trillion) and hence whatever it decides will have major implications, and because it does not report the specific composition of its reserves to the IMF, so it’s unclear how it’s outlook is changing from month to month. Plus, it offers only vague indications of its intentions, so all we can do is speculate.

But speculate we will! While China has publicly maintained its support for the Dollar, quasi-publicly, there is an abundance of concern. This has most recently manifested itself in the form of internal calls for China to use its hoard of reserves to buy natural resources abroad. This wouldn’t necessary involve large-scale selling of its Dollar-denominated assets – since most oil contracts, for example, are still settled in Dollars – but would certainly involve shedding some of them.

As for why Central Banks are dumping Dollars (or simply choosing not to accumulate more of them), that seems pretty obvious. Even ignoring the Dollar’s problems, a well-balanced portfolio is an exercise in risk management. Especially now that many of the Dollar’s rivals are as liquid and as stable as the Greenback, itself, it makes little sense to put all one’s eggs in one basket.

I thought it would be fitting to follow up my last post (Forex in 2009: A Year in Review), with one that looked forward. And what better way to do that then by squarely examining the US Dollar, which is still the undisputed heavyweight champion of forex markets, and from which most other forex trends can be ascertained and comprehended.

December (I know I said I wouldn’t look backwards, but come on, a little context is necessary here…) was the best month for the Dollar in 2009. From December 1 to December 31, it rose 4.7% against the Euro and 7% against the Yen, as part of an overall 4.8% appreciation against a basket of the world’s six other major currencies. “The dollar rally which has taken place in December is significant in that it has brought an end to the powerful downtrend which had been in place since March following the Fed’s decision to begin quantitative easing,” summarizes one analyst. As a result of the Dollar’s strong turnaround in December (and the forgotten fact that it actually appreciated in the beginning of last year), the broadly weighted Dollar Index finished 2009 down a modest 4%.

Analysts summarized this turnaround using a few main paradigms. The first was that logic had returned to the forex markets, such that the negative correlation between equities (which serve as a broad proxy for risk sensitivity) and the Dollar had broken down [See earlier post: “Logic” Returns to the Forex Markets, Benefiting the Dollar]. As a result, good economic news was once again good for the Dollar. The second interpretation was a direct contradiction of the first, and argued that the Dubai debt bomb, coupled with credit scares in Europe, had in fact increased risk aversion, and reinforced the notion that the Dollar is still a safe haven [Edward Hugh mentioned this in my interview of him]. The third theory represents a slight twist on the first one- that concern over Fed interest rate hikes will shift interest rate differentials and cause the Dollar carry trade to break down. Technical analysts, meanwhile, argue that the Dollar had been oversold, and that the year-end rally was merely a product of the closing of short positions and profit-taking.

The key to predicting how the Dollar will perform in 2009, then, largely rests in correctly discerning which paradigm currently underlies the forex markets. Let’s begin by comparing the first possibility – that good economic news will be good for the Dollar – to its antithesis – that the Dollar remains the safe havens. I think two WSJ headlines can shed some light on which interpretation is more accurate: Dollar Rises On Lower Demand For Riskier Assets and Dollar Slumps As Investors Snap Up Risky Assets. In other words, the market logic is that the Dollar is still a safe-haven currency, to the chagrin of market fundamentalists.

While there are certainly “naysayer” analysts that think the US stocks will soon outpace their counterparts abroad (namely in emerging markets), such a view can best be ascribed to the minority. The majority, then, believes that good economic news (from the US, or anywhere else from that matter) is a sign that risk-taking is relatively less risky, and will lead to capital flight from the US. In short, “It’s too early to dismiss the negative correlation between equities markets and the dollar, i.e., when risk appetite declines, that still seems to favor the dollar even though we’ve seen a slight decoupling from that in early December.”

With regard to the notion that the Dollar is being driven by expectations that the Fed will tighten monetary policy at some point in 2010, that seems to have some traction. The markets have priced in a 60% possibility of a Fed rate hike by June, and a majority of economists (9 out of 15 surveyed) think that the Federal Funds rate will be higher at the end of the year. This optimism is a product of the last month, which saw strong improvements in non-farm payrolls, housing sales, durable goods orders, ISM supply index, and more. Some of these indicators are now at their highest levels since 2006; “That speaks better about the health of the U.S. economy and that could help move up the timetable for the Fed to boost interest rates,” goes the accompanying logic.

That investors believe the Fed will hike interest rates and that it will be good for the Dollar is not so much in dispute. Whether investors are right about rate hikes, on the other hand, is less certain. To be sure, momentum is growing in the US as the economy shifts from recession to growth. While current data is unambiguous in this regard, the future is less certain. A vocal minority of analysts argues that the apparent stabilization is largely due to government incentives. When these expire, then, the result could be a double dip in housing prices, and a second act in the economic downturn.

The result, of course, would be a delay and/or slowing in the pace of Fed rate hikes. Some economists predict that that Fed will indeed hike rates in 2010, but only incrementally. Others have argued that it won’t be until 2012 that the Fed lifts its benchmark FFR from the current level of approximately 0%. Instead, the Fed will first move to withdraw some of the liquidity that it unleashed over the last two years, of which an estimated $1.1 Trillion still remains “in play.” Such would be directed primarily at heading off inflation, and wouldn’t do much for the Dollar.

Regardless, the implication is clear: “The fate of the dollar is in the hands of Ben Bernanke. If he begins the exit process and starts to raise interest rates, the dollar will perform okay this year.” If he stalls, and investors accept that they may have gotten ahead of themselves, well, 2010 – especially the second half – could be a sorry year for the Dollar.

In its semi-annual report to Congress, the Treasury Department once again failed to officially label China (or any country for that matter) a currency manipulator. No surprise there. While it’s self-evident that China manipulates the RMB (via the peg with the US Dollar), the political implications of such a label prevent it from being used except in the most extreme cases. Nonetheless, there is mounting pressure on China, both domestic and international, to “adjust” the peg and allow the Yuan to move closer to its fundamental value.

Most of the international pressure has been soft, coming in the form of roundabout pleas for China to allow the Yuan to float “for the sake of global stability.” Said one US Senator weakly, “I hope that with strong leadership from the United States, the G-20 nations and our international institutions will undertake what has been missing — a focused, sustained and meaningful multilateral engagement to address currency manipulation and current imbalances.” At the same time, some of this rhetoric has recently been translated into action. Last month, the Obama Administration enacted a 35% tariff on Chinese tire products. Other countries have also begun to raise concerns about Chinese dumping, and bringing their cases to the WTO for good measure.

Many of these countries are in fact suffering more than the US. Since the Yuan is effectively pegged to the Dollar, the decline of the latter has been mirrored by the former. Since many other currencies of developing countries are also fixed, this leaves only a handful to absorb the shock. For example, the Euro and Yen have both risen about 15% against the RMB over the last year, in line with their appreciation against the Dollar. The handful of floating currencies in the region, such as the Korean Won, Indian Rupee, Malaysian Ringhit, etc. have also faced strong upward pressure. For them, it is not so much the weak Dollar that they fear so much as the weak RMB, since China is a direct competitor to all of them.

More importantly, there are now voices within China’s ruling Communist party that have also begun to press for a stronger Yuan. The Nationalist camp, for example, is pressing for China to make the Yuan a more prominent currency on the international trade scene. While such doesn’t inherently require a floating currency (in fact, all of the trade/swap agreements involving Yuan are based on fixed exchange rates), a loosening of capital controls and liberalizing of financial markets would probably bring about a stronger Yuan.

The other group pushing for a stronger Yuan is doing so on more fundamental, economic grounds. Just-released 2009 Q2 GDP data showed prelimenary growth estimates of a whopping 8.9%! Not bad, especially when you consider that the rest of the world remains mired in recession. Chinese economists largely ignore the political implications of the notion that this growth probably came at the expense of the rest of the world, and focus instead on the economc implications.

First is that the economy remains hopeless dependent on exports to drive growth, which can only be remedid through a stronger Yuan. Second, it heralds the coming of inflation. Many foreigners continue to pour “hot money” into Chinese asset markets hoping to reap the upside from both asset and currency appreciation. In response, “Analysts say China could let the yuan appreciate to help restrain inflation, since a stronger yuan would reduce the cost of imports. But some caution that Beijing tried a similar strategy in early 2008, but didn’t achieve great success in containing inflation or stemming the inflows.”

While analysts don’t expect the Bank of China to allow the RMB to rise until after the Chinese New Year in January, investors are pricing in incremental appreciation every month beginning with the next. In fact, futures prices already reflect the expectation that the RMB will rise 3% over the next twelve-months. My bet is that this will be kicked off by another one-off appreciation, in the same vein as July 2005. Now as was the case then, China needs to make up for lost time.

In my report on last month’s Japanese election, I noted that the newly-appointed Japanese finance minister, Hirohisa Fujii, had spoken out against forex intervention. With that, it seemed the matter was closed.

But not so fast! Over the following few weeks, Fujii (as well other members of the new administration) moved to clarify his position, backtracking, sidestepping, contradicting, but never going forward. The following is a summary of selected remarks, beginning with the original statement against intervention and ending in what seems like a promise to intervene:

September 15: “I basically believe that, in principle, it’s not right for the government to intervene in the free-market economy using its money, either in stock or foreign-exchange markets.”
September 27: [The Yen's rise is] “not abnormal…in terms of trends.”
September 28: “That’s not to say I approve of the yen’s rise.”
September 28: “I don’t think it is proper for the government to intervene in the markets arbitrarily.”
September 29: “If the currency market moves abnormally, we may take necessary steps in the national interest.”
October 3: “As I have said in Tokyo, we will take appropriate steps if one-sided movements become excessive.”
October 5: “If currencies show some excessive moves in a biased direction, we will take action.”

Confused? I know I am. Is it possible to glean any semblance of meaning from these remarks? Summarized one columnist, “Hirohisa Fujii has gone through several cycles of remarks that first appeared to favor a strong yen and then seemed to backpedal after markets took him at his word and sent the Japanese currency soaring.”

I think this encapsulates the regret that Minister Fujii must have felt, after his original comments were taken a little too seriously. In hindsight, it appears that Fujii attempted to convey the new administration’s stance on forex, in a nutshell, and certainly didn’t expect that investors would run wild and send the Yen up another 4%, bringing the year-to-date appreciation against the Dollar to 15%. In the words of the same columnist cited above, “Japan’s finance minister has been rudely reminded of the cardinal rule when speaking to markets — less is more.”

So where does Fujii actually stand? I would personally hazard to guess that his original explication is still the most accurate portrayal of how he will tend to the Yen while in office. The former Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration intervened several times while in office (once under the direction of Fujii himself!) and most recently in 1994. Despite spending trillions of Yen, the campaign only marginally stemmed the rise of the Yen.

Meanwhile, the Japanese economy has been mired in what could be termed the “world’s longest recession, dating back to the 1980’s. It’s clear that the cheap-Yen policy, designed to promote exports, hasn’t benefited the Japanese economy. The new administration, hence, has indicated a shift in strategy, away from export dependence and towards domestic consumption.

Ironically, the nascent Japanese economic turnaround is once again being driven by exports. Fujii is no doubt cognizant of this, and doesn’t want to jeopardize the recovery for the sake of ideology. For example, Toyota Corporation has indicated that a 1% appreciation in the Yen against the Dollar costs the company $400 million in operating income. In addition, while a strong Yen increases the purchasing power of Japanese consumers, an overly strong Yen can lead to deflation, as consumers forestall spending in anticipation of lower prices down the road.

In other words, Fujii is certainly not a proponent of Japan’s recent runup, but his stance is more nuanced than initially understood. “Fujii is basically saying currencies should reflect economic fundamentals and that it is wrong to manipulate their moves to lower the yen for the sake of exporters,” offered one strategist. This, the markets finally seem to understand, and the Yen has actually reversed course over the last week. After all, “A yen in the 80s is excessive,” given the context of record low interest rates and a economy that is still contracting.

In the near-term, then, it doesn’t even make sense to talk about intervention. It seems the markets were getting ahead of themselves in this regard. It doesn’t make sense to price out the possibility of intervention when interevention shouldn’t be a factor in the first place. If on the other hand, the Yen continues to appreciate, then Fujii may have consider how fixed his principles really are.

A theme in forex markets (as well as on the Forex Blog) is that as the Dollar has declined, virtually every other asset/currency has risen. The rationale for this phenomenon is that the global economic recovery is boosting risk appetite, such that investors are now comfortable looking outside the US for yield. However, this market snapshot may have to be tweaked slightly, in accordance with a recent WSJ article (Sterling Looks Ready to Join the Sick List).

According to the report, “Similar to how investors sorted good banks from bad banks earlier this year, foreign-exchange buyers are starting to sort strong currencies from weaker currencies. The pound appears to be joining the dollar in the weak camp. Both countries have near-zero interest-rate targets, an aggressive policy aimed at boosting the economy, and yawning deficits.” In contrast, the article continues, the Yen and the Euro have risen, as have so-called commodity currencies.

While there’s no question that British economic and forex fundamentals are abysmal, it’s a bit hard to understand why the markets are picking on the Pound now. After all, the Euro, Swiss Franc, and Yen, for example, are plagued by some of the same fundamental problems: growing national debt, sluggish growth, low interest rates, etc. Investors can borrow in Yen nearly as cheaply as they can borrow in Dollars or Pounds, and the Bank of Japan is likely to keep rates low at least as long as the Bank of England (BOE), if not longer. Meanwhile, price inflation remains practically non-existent, which means that any capital that investors stash in the UK should be safe.

Perhaps, then, investors are zeroing in on the BOE’s Quantitative Easing program, which is the point of greatest overlap with the US Dollar. Relative to GDP, both currencies’ Central Banks have spent by far the most of any industrialized countries, in pumping newly printed money into credit markets. The BOE, in particular, is actually thinking about expanding its program. At a recent meeting, Mervyn King, Chairman of the Bank, led the opposition in voting for a 15% expansion, but was voted down by a majority of the bank’s other members. “The ‘next decision point‘ will be the Nov. 5 meeting,” said a former Deputy Governor of the Bank, at which point “Bank of England policy makers will consider expanding their bond purchase plan….on concern the economy’s recovery may be a ‘false dawn.’ ”

The government meanwhile has demonstrated a certain ambivalence when it comes to the program. The head of the UK Debt Management Office indirectly encouraged the BOE to continues its purchases of bonds, for fear that stopping doing so could cause yields to skyrocket and make it difficult for the government to fund its activities. “A rapid sell-off could create a downward spiral of gilt prices which would make life harder for both it and the DMO.” On the other hand, one of the leaders of Britain’s conservative party – which is projected to take office after next year’s elections – has criticized the program on the grounds that it will lead to inflation.

From the BOE’s standpoint, it’s a no-win situation. Continue the policy, and you risk inflation and further invoking the ire of politicians. Wind it down, and you could tip the economy back into recession. For better or worse, it seems the BOE will err on the side of the former: “If we stopped supporting the economy now it would crash. Every country in the world and just about every informed commentator is saying the same thing. The job is not finished.” Given that inflation is projected to hover around 0% for the next two years, the BOE still has some breathing room.

As for the charge that the surfeit of cash flowing into markets is weakening the Pound, ‘So be it,’ seems to be the attitude of Mervn King who suggested that, “The weaker pound was ‘helpful’ to efforts to rebalance the British economy toward exports.” While he backtracked afterward, it still stands that the BOE hasn’t made any efforts to stem the decline of the Pound, and is at best indifferent towards it.

Regardless of where the BOE stands, the Pound is not being helped by the weak financial and housing sectors, which during the bubble years, comprised the biggest contribution to UK growth. Exports are weak, and domestic manufacturing activity has yet to stabilize. As a result, “The British economy will contract 4.4 percent this year before expanding 0.9 percent in 2010, the International Monetary Fund predicts.”

Objectively speaking, then, it makes sense to call the Pound sick. Still, many other currencies are just as sick. I guess the perennial lesson is that in forex, everything is relative.

The dollar slid quickly in overnight trading as investors awaited today’s decisions from the Federal Reserve and the upcoming G20 summit in Pittsburgh.  Meanwhile, equity markets surged and oil edged up after a slight trimming in Monday trading.

The euro hit a one-year high against the battered dollar rising to $1.48 and closing in on the vaunted $1.50 threshold.  Most investors feel the euro will top the $1.50 mark by the end of the year.  In overnight trading, traders took advantage of the dollar’s Monday success and a lack of liquidity as the Japanese markets remained closed for the holiday.  The dollar hit a 14-month low against the Swiss frank settling at 1.0248 franks.  The euro was up 0.8% at the close.

Against a basket of currencies, the dollar .DXY fell 0.8% and approached the one-year low of 76.1 before settling at 76.155.  Investors expect the Federal Reserve to stay the course and continue stimulus spending until housing settles and unemployment joins the recovery.  The index has trimmed more than 2% in September as higher yielding currencies continue to attract investors.

Overnight, the dollar fell 1% against the yen to 91.15.  The New Zealand dollar jumped 2% to $0.7210, a 13 month high against the dollar.

The Fed Announces Interest Rates Today

Amid signs of growing tensions between the Federal Reserve, the Treasury and the FDIC, the Fed commences two days of meetings that will have implications on interest rates, the dollar and the trajectory of the recovery.  There appears to be disagreement among the Federal Reserve’s members as the rate of inflation and the effect of the continued stimulus spending come under review.

While Fed Chairman Bernanke has signaled positive trends in an economic bounce-back, the climate seems tenuous.  With the first time homebuyer tax credit, which helped more than 1.2 million first time buyers enter the housing market, due to expire on November 30^th, with unemployment continuing to close in on 10% and with a desire to pull back from continued stimulus spending, the Federal Reserve is walking a delicate tightrope.

Meanwhile, the world is watching and hoping that stimulus spending will continue despite its effect on the value of the dollar.  At the core of the national and global recovery is the American consumer who is staring at a shaky job market and a housing market that has cut 30% of their real estate equity.

On top of this balancing act, the Obama Administration is preparing for a definitive performance at the two-day Group of 20 meeting beginning on Thursday. 

In light of Bernanke’s recent comments about the state of the recovery and with some positive macroeconomic date, equity and forex markets await a signal that the Federal Reserve will pull back from the stimulus.  Such an announcement would certainly spark a reaction from the G20 ministers who are more interested in details about U.S. financial regulatory reform.