The Swiss National Bank (SNB) has apparently admitted (temporary) defeat in its battle to hold down the value of the Franc. ” ‘The SNB has reached its limits and if the market wants to see a franc at 1.35 versus the euro, they won’t be able to stop it.’ ” The markets have won. The SNB has lost.

Still, the SNB should be applauded for its efforts. As you can see from the chart above, it managed to keep the Franc from rising above €1.50 (its so-called line in the sand) for the better part of 2009. Furthermore, by most accounts, it managed to slow the Franc’s unavoidable descent against the Euro in 2010. While the Dollar has appreciated more than 15% against the Euro, the Franc has a risen by a more modest 10%. ” ‘Without that €90 billion [intervention], it’s fair to say that the euro would be closer to $1.10,’ ” argued one analyst. In fact, as recently as May 18, the SNB manifested its power in the form of 1-day, 2% decline in the Franc, its sharpest fall in more than a year.

Overall, the SNB has spent more than $200 Billion over the last 12 months, including $73 Billion in the month of May alone. ” ‘To put the figures in perspective, there have been only two months when China, the world’s largest holder of forex reserves with $2,249bn in assets, saw its reserves increase more.’ ” The SNB now claims the world’s 7th largest foreign exchange reserves, ahead of the perennial interveners of Brazil in Hong Kong, the latter of whose currency is pegged against the Dollar.

While the SNB can take some credit for halting the decline in the Franc, it was ultimately done in by factors beyond its control, namely the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis and consequent surge in risk aversion. At this point the forces that the SNB is battling against are too large to be contained: “We’re talking about a massive euro crisis, so no single central bank can prop it up on its own,” summarized one trader. As a result, the Franc is now rising to a fresh record high against the Euro nearly every trading session.

Still, the SNB remains committed to rhetorical intervention. “The central bank has a ‘clear aim‘ to maintain price stability and this is what guides its policy actions, SNB President Philipp Hildebrand said…The bank will act in a ‘decisive manner if needed.’ ” That means that if economic growth slows and/or deflation sets it, it may have to restart the printing presses. Given that its economy is slated to grow at a solid 1.5% this year, unemployment is a meager 3.8%, and the threat of inflation has largely abated. On the other hand, the prospect of a drawn-out crisis in the EU means the Franc will probably continue to appreciate – without help from the Central Bank: ” ‘The SNB may continue to intervene in the currency markets until 2020,’ ” declared the head of forex research for UBS.

The implications for currency markets are interesting. Not only has the SNB prevented the Euro from falling too fast against the Franc, but it may also have prevented it from falling too quickly against other currencies. ” ‘To suggest that the SNB has been the savior of the euro is too much. But one could imagine that if the euro starts to decline again, the market may blame the fact that the SNB isn’t buying,’ ” said a currency strategist from Standard Bank.

This episode is also a testament to the limits of intervention. It has always been clear (to this blogger, at least) that intervention is futile in the long-term. The best that a Central Bank can hope for is to stall a particular outcome long enough in order to achieve a certain short-term policy aim. When enough momentum coalesces behind a (floating) currency, there is nothing that a Central Bank can do to stop it from moving to the rate that investors collectively deem it to be worth.

The South Korean Won has been one of the biggest losers from the EU sovereign debt crisis. After a stellar 2009, the Won is off to a shaky start in 2010, and has lost 12% of its value in the last month alone. According to analysts, The won is “most sensitive to risk aversion” of any currency in Asia – or even the world. Thus, when the President of Hungary likened his country’s fiscal situation to that of Greece and inadvertently ignited fears that the crisis was spreading, the Korean Won immediately fell by 5% – the largest decline in 17 months.

Given all of the economies/currencies from which to choose, it seems bizarre that investors would gang up on the Won. That is, until you consider that South Korea’s fiscal situation is somewhat unique and that funding crises tend to hit the country especially hard. Summarized one analyst: “We are concerned that the negative market view of events in Europe will not dissipate and that the longer the stress continues, the more concerns will arise that the peripheral funding crisis could segue into a more extended funding crisis and into lower growth expectations.”

To elaborate, South Korea’s short-term foreign currency debt is extremely high (60% of foreign exchange reserves). That’s primarily due to Korean exporters’ hedging activities, which for risk management purposes, need to be offset by short-term borrowing by banks in the money market. Since this debt needs to be rolled over frequently, South Korea is especially vulnerable to liquidity crunches. In fact, the Won has been called a “VIX currency,” since it tends to fall when volatility (proxied by the VIX index) rises. Hence, the Won lost 50% of its value during the peak of the credit crisis, and has already declined 10% this time around.

The Central Bank is doing its part to relieve the liquidity shortage and stem the Won’s decline. It has already placed modest limits on speculative derivative transactions with the goal of limiting capital flight. It is pressing to renew currency swaps with the Fed and the Bank of Japan in order to increase the supply of alternative currency. In addition, it has taken to intervening directly in currency markets by selling Billions of Dollars on the spot market. Explaining the first market intervention in more than a year, the Central Bank declared, “The dollar’s surge against the won today was overdone. The authorities will try to prevent one-way currency moves.”

There are also a handful of market analysts who attribute the Won’s fall to the ongoing conflict with North Korea. In response to the sinking of a warship in March, South Korea has responded by imposing trade sanctions on North Korea, which in turn has responded with threats of “all-out war.” From a forex standpoint, “The largest concern is that the cutting off of economic links raises the risk of a sudden regime collapse, resulting in the South facing a huge influx of refugees. This would have a significant — and possibly prolonged — impact on the Korean won.”

How should one proceed? If indeed you believe that the Won is being harmed by the prospect of conflict with North Korea, you might be inclined to agree with the notion that, “The recent sell-off in the won has been overdone and should correct, assuming that the North-South tensions will ease in the months ahead.” In fact, if war is avoided, the current bear market could be an excellent buying opportunity, and the Won could still be on track to rise to 1,100 USD/KRW by year-end, conforming to analysts’ median expectations.

On the other hand, if you believe that the Won’s woes are largely attributable to the EU fiscal crisis, there is very little reason to hold the Won, since that crisis will probably only get worse before it gets better: “The Korean market was precariously positioned, with high multiples, above-trend earnings, heavy positioning towards risk and ominous technicals suggesting little sponsorship for strength.” In this case, the Won could easily fall to 1,300 – or worse – before the year is out.

In any event, South Korea will host a meeting of the G20 this week, which should yield more clarity into what the rest of 2010 has in store for the Won.

With so much to think about these days, I havn’t spent much time poring over foreign exchange reserve statistics. Apparently, this is to my detriment, as there have been a number of important developments on this front, some of which carry far-reaching forex implications.

I’m guessing a lot of you are probably in the same boat as me, wondering why forex reserves are worth paying any attention to. While busy looking at complex charts and GDP/inflation statistics, however, we forget that a currency’s value is fundamentally determined by supply and demand. In other words, while bullish/bearish indicators and interest rates are the proximal factors behind forex, the supply/demand dynamic is the ultimate factor. And Central Banks, collectively, comprise one of the largest contingents behind this supply/demand.

As I was saying, this equilibrium is currently undergoing a seismic shift. Specifically, “The dollar’s share in official foreign exchange reserves in 140 countries has fallen to its lowest level since euro cash was introduced in 2002, according to the IMF.” The Euro, Yen, and “other currencies” (i.e. minor currencies that are collectively important but individually unimportant), meanwhile, have seen increased interest from Central Banks. This is consistent with another report I saw recently, enunciating that,”Global reserves probably gained by about $180 billion in the third quarter with U.S. dollar-denominated reserves accounting for about $50 billion or less than 30 percent.”

This came as a shock to many market observers, who assumed that many economies lacked either the capacity or the impetus to diversify their reserves, especially since many of them peg their currencies to the Dollar. These countries are savvier than they used to be, however: “Emerging market central banks are selling their local currencies and buying U.S. dollars to prevent appreciation of their currencies. They’re avoiding having a bigger concentration of U.S. dollars in their portfolio by turning around and selling dollars against the euro and other currencies.”

Even industrialized countries, whose forex reserves are dwarfed by their emerging market counterparts, are jumping into diversification. After a nearly 10-year hiatus, Canada will jump back into the forex reserve game, by $1 Billion in foreign currency bonds, denominated in Euros. According to one analyst, “This…should be viewed in the context of the entire developed world, which is in the process of generally ramping up the size of its foreign reserves, and subtly shifting away from USD.”

The wild card is China. I use the term wild card both because China’s forex reserves are the world’s largest (recently confirmed at $2.4 Trillion) and hence whatever it decides will have major implications, and because it does not report the specific composition of its reserves to the IMF, so it’s unclear how it’s outlook is changing from month to month. Plus, it offers only vague indications of its intentions, so all we can do is speculate.

But speculate we will! While China has publicly maintained its support for the Dollar, quasi-publicly, there is an abundance of concern. This has most recently manifested itself in the form of internal calls for China to use its hoard of reserves to buy natural resources abroad. This wouldn’t necessary involve large-scale selling of its Dollar-denominated assets – since most oil contracts, for example, are still settled in Dollars – but would certainly involve shedding some of them.

As for why Central Banks are dumping Dollars (or simply choosing not to accumulate more of them), that seems pretty obvious. Even ignoring the Dollar’s problems, a well-balanced portfolio is an exercise in risk management. Especially now that many of the Dollar’s rivals are as liquid and as stable as the Greenback, itself, it makes little sense to put all one’s eggs in one basket.

After a brief pause, the world’s Central Banks (or at least those in Asia) have begun to once again accumulate foreign exchange reserves. I’m not one for hyperbole, but the figures are downright eye-popping: “Reserves held by 11 key Asian central banks totaled $2.625 trillion at the end of August, up from $2.569 trillion at the end of July, according to calculations by Dow Jones Newswires.” Most incredible is that this total doesn’t even include China. whose reserves could exceed $2.3 Trillion by now.

The credit crisis was initially marked by a collapse in trade and an exodus of capital from Asia, as western consumers tightened their wallets and investors flocked to so-called safe havens. As developing countries fought off currency depreciation, forex reserve levels plummeted. Less than a year later, trade has already picked back up, investors have returned en masse to emerging markets, and Central Banks are once again sterilizing capital inflows so as to mitigate upward pressure on their respective currencies. [Chart Below courtesy of Council of Foreign Relations.]

“Taiwan and Thailand, the most aggressive in defending the U.S. currency, have logged record-high reserves every month since December.” Japan, whose reserves are the second highest in the world (after China), is the lone holdout. As the Forex Blog reported yesterday, the newly elected Democratic Party of Japan will pursue an economic policy that depends less on exports, and has pledged to stay out of the forex markets.

The prospects for further reserve accumulation remain reasonably bright, as emerging markets lead the global economy towards recovery. “The outlook for key Asian economies is improving faster than that of developed economies. For the time being, this should accelerate flows into these markets, making it harder for central banks to keep their currencies in check.”

While China’s economy is no exception, its nascent recovery is being driven by capital investment, government spending, and (ultimately?) consumer spending. As a result, it is forecast that “China’s current-account surplus will fall to under 6% of GDP this year and 4% in 2010, down from a peak of 11% in 2007. Exports amounted to 35% of GDP in 2007; this year…that ratio will drop to 24.5%.” If such an outcome obtains, it will almost certainly lead to a slower accumulation of reserves.

While this is all well and good, the more important question for most (forex) analysts is how these reserves are being held. The vast majority of these reserves are still denominated in US Dollar assets, and in fact, the proportion may have risen slightly since the beginning of the credit crisis. Asian Central Banks are particularly biased towards the Dollar, which accounts for 70% of their reserves, compared to the worldwide Central Bank average of 64%.

Moreover, it doesn’t look like plans are afoot to change this trend anytime soon. China has maintained its push (though less vocally) to turn the Chinese Yuan into a global reserve currency, declaring that its capital markets and currency controls will open accordingly to facilitate such. It is in preliminary talks with Thailand for yet another currency swap agreement, to supplement the $95 Billion in such deals signed since December. For its part, the Bank of Thailand has insisted that the Yuan is not even close to challenging the supremacy of the Dollar: “You have to accept that the dollar is going to be a reserve currency for quite some time. You don’t have any alternatives.”

Even China, despite its rhetoric, remains committed to the Dollar. The only talk of diversification in Chinese investment circles is in regards to what kinds of US assets they should invest in, not whether they should be invested in the US or somewhere else. Said the manager of China Investment Corp, which has a mandate to invest nearly $300 Billion of China’s FX reserves, “The risk of a decline in the dollar risks was more of a national issue for China than for CIC because its capital is in dollars.”

This last quote inadvertently confirms that the role of the Dollar as the world’s reserve currency is being treated as a political issue, when in fact it is a financial economic issue. In other words, while many countries want to limit the influence of the US by limiting the power of the Dollar, their Central Banks are stuck with it because it remains the most practical, and advantageous option. Dumping it would be akin to punishing themselves.

The Brazilian Real has been one of the world’s best performers in 2009, having risen by a solid 25%. The currency is now close to pre-credit crisis levels, and is even closing in on an 11-year high. When you consider that only six months ago, most analysts were painting doomsday scenarios and predicting currency devaluations and bond defaults for the entire continent, this is pretty incredible!

The currency’s rise has been supported by a variety of factors, few of which are grounded in fundamentals. To begin with, while Brazil has staved off depression, it’s not as if the economy is firmly back on solid footing. The economy contracted by 5% in the first quarter, and forecasts for 2009 GDP growth still vary widely, from a slight contraction to modest expansion. Meanwhile, the economy is importing more than it exports, despite the rebound in commodity prices. “The central bank said the net trade result was based on $9.89 billion in receipts for exports and $12.72 billion in import payments overseas.”

“Investment inflows, meanwhile, totaled $33.88 billion, while outflows totaled $29.78 billion.” The disparity between investment and trade data goes a long way towards explaining the Real’s rise. Thanks to a recovery in risk appetite, foreigners have poured cash into Brazil at an even faster rate than they once removed it. As a result, Brazil’s “Bovespa stock index has risen 51 percent this year, the world’s 12th-best performer among 89 measures tracked by Bloomberg, as foreign investors moved 13.7 billion reais into the market through July, the most since the exchange began tracking data in 1993. Brazilian local bonds returned 37 percent in dollar terms after falling 13.8 percent in 2008.” The country’s foreign exchange reserves also just set a new record, surging past the $200 Billion mark.

Brazilian interest rates tell the rest of the story. Despite a gradual decline over the last decade (made possible by a moderation in inflation), Brazil’s benchmark SELIC rate stands at a healthy 8.65%, which is the highest in South America, after Argentina. Unlike Argentina – and the dozen or so other economies around the world that boast equally lofty interest rates – Brazil is perceived as relatively safe place to invest. Given interest rate levels in the western world, combined with the expectation that Brazil’s currency will appreciate further, investors are more than happy to accept a little bit of risk in order to earn an out-sized return.

Just like the Bank of Korea, Bank of England (both profiled by the Forex Blog in the last week), the Bank of Brazil is not happy with the resilience in its currency. “Brazil’s central bank said on Wednesday it bought $779 million on the spot foreign exchange market this month to Aug. 7 as dollar inflows to the country surged because of growing demand for local stocks and bonds.” This brings the total intervention expenditure to $9 Billion.

Unfortunately for the Bank of Brazil, the forces in the forex market are way beyond its control. “Dollar inflows to the country totaled $2.26 billion this month to Aug. 7, compared with inflows of $1.27 billion in all of July.” Analysts are also unconvinced, and are racing to revise their Real forecasts upward. One economist, caught completely off guard, just “changed his year-end real forecast to 1.8 from 2.5 at the start of the year. ‘The resilience of the Brazilian economy to weather this crisis has been spectacular,’ ” he explained.

Last year the Korean Won was one of the world’s weakest currencies- and that’s saying a lot when you you consider how many currencies tanked at the onset of the credit crisis. The Won lost nearly half of its value, driven by concerns that Korean creditors would be unable to pay their foreign debts. Since March, however, the currency has rebounded by an impressive 25%, as the government took action: “To avert a crisis, South Korea forged a dollar-swap agreement with the U.S., pumped money into the banking system, boosted fiscal spending, set up funds to replenish bank capital and cut rates.”

In the last quarter, South Korea’s economy grew 2.3%, the fastest pace in nearly six years, marking a significant turnaround from the 5% contraction recorded in the fourth quarter of 2008. Still, “South Korea’s economy will shrink 1.8 percent this year, the IMF said yesterday, revising a July prediction for a 3 percent contraction.” Exports, which account for 50% of GDP, have also recovered, and are now rising by nearly 20% on an annualized basis. Retail sales are climbing, and bank lending to households has risen for six straight months. Finally, “Stimulus measures at home and abroad are fueling South Korea’s revival. The government has pledged more than 67 trillion won ($53 billion) in extra spending, helping consumer confidence climb to the highest in almost two years in June.”

However, an inflow of speculative hot money – which has buttressed a rally in Korean stocks – threatens to undo the recovery. “With an anticipated increase in risk appetite, foreign investors may invest further in emerging-market equities, leading to more dollar supply,” said one analyst. The first half 2009 current account surplus set a record, with forecasts for the second half not far behind. Korea’s foreign exchange reserves, meanwhile, have recovered, and could touch $300 Billion within the next year.

Of course, the Central bank is not simply standing by idly. It has already lowered its benchmark rate to a record low 2%, and at yesterday’s monthly monetary policy meeting, it firmly refused to consider raising it for at least six months. Commented one analyst, “There is no urgent need to raise rates. The most likely course of action is that the Bank of Korea will wait until the economy fully recovers, and in particular, they will wait until the unemployment rate stops increasing.” Still, given both that interest rates remain above levels in the west (see chart below) and that the Korean Won is considered undervalued, funds could continue to flow in.

The Central Bank’s other tool is direct intervention in the forex markets, in order to depress the strengthening Won. But this, it is loathe to do: ” ‘It would be better to have a larger foreign exchange reserve in order to better deal with economic crises, but attempts to buy dollars to artificially boost the reserve volume could lead to accusations of currency manipulation, while excess won in the markets could stoke inflation,’ a high-ranking ministry official said.” Still, investors are growing increasingly nervous about this possibility:”A state-run bank that usually doesn’t participate much in the market bought some dollars at the day’s low, prompting speculation about a possible intervention, a local bank trader said.” Sure enough, after hitting the psychologically important level of 1,220 at the end of July, the Won dived. It has yet to bounce back.

Over the last year, Israel has quietly amassed one of the world’s largest repositories of foreign exchange reserves. On average, the Central Bank of Israel has purchased $100 million worth of Dollars every day since July 2008, bringing its total reserves to $52 Billion. The Bank’s goals are twofold: to sterilize the inflow of speculative money pouring into Israel in order to mitigate inflation, and to stem the appreciation of the Shekel.

Towards this latter, the Bank received a boost by the credit crisis, which caused an outbreak of risk aversion and sent investors rushing to shift funds into so-called safe haven countries/currencies. As a result, the Israeli stock market tanked, and the Shekel plummeted 30% in a matter of months.

Thanks to the recent upswing in risk appetite, however, the Shekel has bounced back, having risen 10% since April. While the Shekel still remains well off its its 2008 highs, the sudden rise still elicited the attention of the Bank of Israel, which announced that it would respond to the, “Unusual movements in the exchange rate that are inconsistent with underlying economic conditions, or when conditions in the foreign exchange market are disorderly,” by intervening heavily in the open market. It “is believed to have purchased between $1.5-1.7 billion this week so far.”

The Bank has also taken steps to inadvertently degrade its currency by lowering its benchmark interest rate to .5%, and buying bonds on the open market. “The central bank will have bought a total of 18 billion shekels ($4.7 billion) of bonds when it completes the program….The bank said in its statement that it does not intend to sell the securities it purchased and will continue buying foreign currency.” While its unclear whether the program has succeeded in stimulating the economy – which contracted by 3.7% last quarter – it has provoked inflation, which is still running in excess of 3% per year.

The forex markets have taken notice of both developments, sending the Shekel down 4% since Monday. Still, it’s not clear whether the Bank of Israel has any real credibility with traders. By its own admission, its intervention program is temporary: “It is clear that we won’t carry on buying foreign currency forever. Everybody understands that the central bank can’t beat the market, but sometimes the market does things that are not justified.”

Analysts, meanwhile, insist that the Shekel’s appreciation is not unusual, and that the intervention runs counter to fundamentals. “[The] market pressures strengthening the shekel against the dollar, are, in fact, consistent with underlying economic conditions. Fundamental economic conditions favoring the revaluation of the shekel include the accumulation of a balance of payments credit of $4.3 billion over the past thee quarters.” These analysts, then, are more concerned about rising inflation then about the competitiveness of Israeli exports.

Barclays, an investment bank, evidently subscribes to this school of though, and predicts the Shekel “will increase 2% after breaching their so-called resistance levels.” Merrill Lynch, meanwhile, sees the Shekel appreciating an additional 10% over the next year.