Recently, it struck me: the US does not care about the Dollar. If you look at fiscal and monetary policy, there is actually a remarkable degree of consistency. Both reflect a clear disregard for the conditions that are necessary for a strong currency.

This might seem ridiculous, given the Dollar’s amazing performance of late. It has appreciated healthily against almost all of the world’s major currencies, and is also more valuable on a trade-weighted basis. Bear in mind, however, that this rise is entirely a function of the (perceived) crisis in Europe. It speaks not to any strength in the Dollar, but rather to weakness in other currencies. In fact, as I wrote earlier this week (”US Dollar Paradigm Shift“), as investors have returned their gaze to the fundamentals, the Dollar has suffered.

Without drilling into the nuts and bolts of US fiscal policy, consider that the US budget deficit will exceed an unthinkable $1 Trillion for a second year in a row. The national debt is now growing much faster than GDP, and servicing it is consuming an ever-increasing share of the budget. With concerns looming of a double-dip recession, meanwhile, tax revenues will probably stagnate, even regardless of what happens to spending. In short, US budget deficits are going to continue to be a fact of life for the immediate future.

Monetary Policy is equally disastrous. The Fed is pre-occupied with keeping interest rates low and with promoting an economic recovery. $2 Trillion of newly-minted money is still flowing through the system, and it’s unclear when it will be siphoned out. There are a few inflation hawks on the Fed’s Board of Governors, but they lack the power to effect a short-term change in monetary policy.

The Bank for International Settlements (BIS), G20, and a pair of economists, among others, have all sounded alarm bells, calling such policies foolish and unsustainable. According to the BIS, “Keeping interest rates very low comes at a cost—a cost that is growing with time. Experience teaches us that prolonged periods of unusually low rates cloud assessments of financial risks, induce a search for yield and delay balance-sheet adjustments.”

In short, there is a clear consensus that perennial budget deficits and low rates are wrongheaded at best, and disastrous at worst. From the standpoint of currency markets, what matters in the short-term are interest rates, and what matters in the long-term is inflation. The Dollar is in an unfavorable position on both fronts. Interest rates are currently near 0% – the lowest in the world – and easy monetary policy and high government debt increase the likelihood of inflation in the wrong-term.

In light of this notion, the only logical conclusion is that the Dollar simply plays no role in the formulation of government and Central Bank decision-making. Since the inception of the credit crisis, this was a luxury that could be afforded, as safe-haven capital poured into the US. If/when the crisis abates, this capital will probably depart, as investors are forced to consider the fundamentals.

The Japanese yen has fallen 5% against the Dollar over the last month, and 10% since touching a record high in November. Since this certainly isn’t explainable in the context of the EU debt crisis, what’s going on?!

The primary factor behind the Yen’s decline appears to be seasonal, given the “end of the Japanese fiscal year on March 31, a time when Japanese corporations stop their annual repatriation of foreign profits by converting them into yen, which had kept demand for the currency high.” Analysts add that “A new fiscal year also is a chance for Japanese investors to reset strategies for sending capital abroad and for Japanese companies to set hedging bets for the coming year.” In short, this trend is short-term, and will likely abate in the coming weeks.

Beyond this, it’s difficult to explain the Yen’s decline in terms of financial and economic factors. Japans economy is still lackluster, though its stock market is performing well. I have blogged recently about Japan’s budget deficits and soaring national debt, but given that this debt is financed domestically, fluctuations in the risk of Japanese sovereign default have very little impact on the exchange rate. It’s possible that an increase in risk appetite and consequent revival in the carry trade is behind the Yen’s weakness, but given that US interest rates remain just as low, it makes little sense that the Yen should be falling so precipitously against the Dollar.

Rather, any full explanation must involve the the government of Japan, which appears to have grown increasingly uncomfortable with the persistent strength in the Japanese Yen. Previously, the government (through the Finance Minister) had vehemently denounced the possibility of, intervention on behalf of the Yen and that exchange rates should be determined by market forces, etc. After backtracking, that Minister was replaced (ostensibly for health reasons), and leaders are no longer mincing their words. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama recently declared, “the yen’s strength is out of step with the country’s fragile economic recovery, urging the government to take ‘firm steps’ to counter the growth-limiting effects of a strong currency.”

Even though the Japanese economy grew by a healthy 3.8% in the fourth quarter of 2009, there remain concerns of contraction and deflation. Many experts agree that the Yen is overvalued, which means that exports are less than what they could be. Analysts love to point out that Japan’s economy is so sensitive to changes in exchange rates, that a fall of one “unit” (100 pips) in the Japanese Yen would be enough to cause some companies to swing from profit to loss. Simply, there is too much at stake for the Japanese economy (and the incumbent Japanese government) to simply let the Yen be.

As a result, many analysts believe that intervention is now inevitable, unless the Yen continues to rise. According to Morgan Stanley, “The probability Japan will sell the yen has climbed to 47 percent, the highest since 2004…based on a company model that uses indicators such as market positioning and changes in momentum.” Other analysts believe that the markets will instead preemptively push down the Yen, which would achieve the same result as intervention: “Brown Brothers Harriman analyst Marc Chandler figures if the dollar breaks above 94 yen, because of the way investors place currency bets, the greenback could more easily extend its run as high as 96 or 98 yen.”

For now, the Central Bank of Japan will attempt to use monetary policy to coax down the Yen, perhaps through a combination of liquidity programs and money-printing, but there are a handful of important meeting coming up, during which time it could conceivably decide to join the ranks of a handful of other Central Banks which have already moved to depress their currencies. Let the Beggar Thy Neighbor Currency Devaluation begin.

One of the pitfalls of forex blogging (or all financial reporting for that matter) is that it’s inherently after-the fact. In other words, any information about the past – while relevant – is inherently useless, since it has theoretically already been priced into the asset (or currency in this case). Before I begin my post on the Pound’s recent decline and the factors that wrought it, then, I wanted to offer the caveat that in analyzing past events, we must simultaneously look to the future.

Anyway, for anyone watching the Pound Sterling over the last month, its performance has been startling. It is down 7.5% for the year already (we’re only in March!), and has fallen 12% from its August peak of 1.70 USD/GBP. This represents an unbelievable about-face, as the Pound spent much of 2009 floating upwards following its lows from the credit crisis.

What’s behind the decline? In short, economics and politics, or more precisely, the junction of economics and politics. As the British economy began its recovery from recession, analysts began to turn their attention to UK government finances. Another way of looking at this would be to say that analysts have shifted their gaze from the positive effect of government intervention (i.e. economic recovery) to the many lasting negative effects. Inflation and government solvency, of course, are the two most pernicious of the bunch.

The Bank of England’s quantitative easing program was comparable to the Fed’s program in relative terms, and in the aftermath of all of that money creation, inflation is slowly creeping up. The government’s free spending also contributed, and now, so is the sinking Pound, as prices for commodities and other imports are rising fast in local currency terms. Speaking of government spending, the UK government budget deficit is projected at 12% for 2010, slightly higher than 2009. You can see from the chart below that budget deficits are forecast to remain large for the next few years. Expectations are so low, in fact, that a reduction in the deficit to 3% of GDP by 2014-2015 would be viewed as a victory.

Naturally, the UK government feels some pressure to reduce its deficit, both for the sake of financial solvency and to control inflation. The problem is that an election must be called before June, and until then, there is natural pressure to continue operating the money printing presses 24/7 in order to appease the voting public. The same goes for the Bank of England; it can’t be expected to tighten monetary policy and/or reverse quantitative easing until after the election.

I’m not going to pretend that I understand British politics, but from what I’m hearing, it seems the problem is that the election polls are now very close. Previously, a major victory by the Conservative Party was seen as inevitable, and this was viewed positively by financial markets because of the expectation that they would rein in spending. Recently, the incumbent Labour Party has closed the gap, to the extent that a hung Parliament is now a likely outcome. This would be even less desirable than an outright Labour victory, because the sharing of power would make it unlikely that reforms of any kind would be enacted. With regard to forex, some have posited an inverse correlation between the rising popularity of Labour and the falling Pound.

With the crisis in Greece still unresolved, analysts are also making comparisons to the UK. Some have suggested that if Greece were to receive a bailout, then, investors would turn their attention to the UK, whose finances are in equally bad shape. Without the protection of the Euro, the Pound would be open to speculative attack. On the other hand, that the (declining) Pound is independent from the Euro could become in advantage, if it boosts exports.

Going forward, it’s difficult to make any predictions until after the elections and/or the government makes a firm commitment to reduce spending and lower its deficit. Some analysts think that regardless, the Pound is doomed to continue falling, perhaps all the way to the $1.40 mark. Others see the current decline as the “darkness before the dawn.” As I noted in the introduction to this post, the latter could certainly be right. Besides, most of the uncertainty has probably already priced in. While most of the factors currently weighing on the Pound are bearish, some contrarian investors might see this as a good opportunity to buy. And who’s to say they’re wrong?

Currency markets operate in funny ways. Greece’s fiscal problems are hardly a new development. During years of boom and bust alike, it ran unsustainable budget deficits. Why investors have decided to fret now – as opposed to last year or next year, for example – on the distant possibility of default, is somewhat mysterious.

After all, the credit crisis exploded in 2008, and conditions now are inarguably more stable than they were at this time last year, when volatility and credit default spreads (insurance against bond default) – two of the best measures of investor risk sensitivity – were still hovering around record highs. On the other hand, the unveiling of Dubai’s hidden debt problems, has certainly provided impetus to investors to re-evaluate the fiscal situations in other highly leveraged economies. In addition, Greece just estimated that its budget deficit for 2010 at 12.7%, 4% higher than earlier estimates, which were also shockingly high. Regardless of 1, the markets are now focused firmly on Greece – and by extension, the Euro.

How serious are Greece’s fiscal problems? Serious, but not insurmountable. Its sovereign debt recently surpassed 125% of GDP, higher than the US, but lower than Japan, for the sake of comparison. Of course, the Greek economy is hardly a picture of robustness. Neither is the US, these days, for that matter, but its size means that it is pretty much immune from speculative attacks on its credit and capital markets. Greece, on the other hand, remains extremely vulnerable to the whims of international investors.

On the whole, these investors still remain willing to finance Greece’s budget deficits; the last bond issue was five times oversubscribed, which means that demand exceeded supply by a healthy margin. Still, interest rates are rising quickly, and spreads on credit default spreads have risen above 400 basis points, suggesting that nervousness is growing and Greece cannot take for granted that future bond issues will be met with such healthy demand.

In this context, in stepped the European Union. In fact, it isn’t even clear if Greece asked for help. As I pointed out above, the Greek debt “crisis” is largely playing out in capital markets, and doesn’t necessarily reflect a change in the fiscal reality of Greece. Still, leaders of the EU were alarmed enough to convene a meeting between the finance ministers of member states, to discuss their options.

After weeks of denial that any kind of aid to Greece was being considered, EU political leaders announced that they were prepared to step in to help after all, but they were vague on the details. There were no ledges of specifc dollar amounts, only hazy promises of support should conditions warrant it. In the end, what was clearly intended to comfort the markets achieved the opposite effect, as investors took no comfort in the “moral support” and worried about the new uncertainty.

It’s premature to say whether this whole episode will threaten the viability of the Euro. Much depends on whether Greece (Portugal and Spain, too, for that matter) can get its fiscal house in order (Among other things, it has promised to reduce its 2010 budget deficit by 4%). More importantly, it depends how, and to what extent, the EU responds to this crisis as a community. The Euro is already 10 years old, and you would think that it would have been accepted already within the EU, as it has by the rest of the world. On the contrary, it remains deeply divisive and fraught with politics. Many of its critics have seized on this opportunity to challenge to raise fresh calls for its abolishment. If the problems of Greece deteriorate to the point that other EU members are actually required to intervene, you can expect these calls to crescendo.

In October, I wrote about a “separation” that had taken place in currency markets between the “sick” currencies and the “healthy” currencies. At the time, I argued that the former category was comprised mainly of the Dollar and the Pound, with most other currencies healthy by comparison. While I still stand by this paradigm, I would like to revise it slightly. Specifically, I would like to add the Euro and the Yen to this list.

The recent blow-up surrounding the downgrade of Greece’s debt and subsequent explosion in the price of credit default swaps (which insure against default), have shined a spotlight on the fiscal problems of many of the EU’s member states, including Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and others. The situation in Japan, meanwhile, has been much more gradual, though equally dangerous: “In 1990, Japan’s total national debt load was 390% of GDP. Now it’s 460%. In the interim, the country has suffered sub-par growth and routine recessions.”

The fiscal problems of the US and UK governments as well as the debts of their citizens and companies have long been famous. For that reason, when the sick/healthy paradigm was first proposed, they were the two most obvious candidates. Having conducted some additional analysis, it’s now patently obvious that the same problems affect the EU and Japan. Given that their economies are also in weak shape, it doesn’t really make sense to group them in with the healthy currencies. Canada (and the Loonie, by extension) is also looking sickly, with its surging national debt and record budget deficits. The only reason it is being spared from the list is because of its richness in natural resources; in other words, it has something tangible that it can use to pay its debts.

Among the so-called majors, then, only the Swiss Franc, Canadian Loonie, Australian Dollar, and New Zealand Dollar get clean bills of health. A re-casting of the paradigm, then, would put the super-majors (Euro, Yen, Pound, and Dollar account for more than 75% of all foreign exchange activity) on one side, and virtually every other currency on the other. Given that national debt ratios and interest rate differentials diverge across the same boundary, it’s not hard to conjure a basis for this partition. “The IMF forecasts that gross government debt among advanced economies will continue to rise until 2014, reaching 114% of GDP, compared to just 35% for developing nations.” Adds another analyst: “If you look at currencies as a proxy for growth, then you can anticipate that emerging-market currencies will appreciate against the dollar.”

There is also a correction that is taking place within the group of sick currencies. Investors have come to realize belatedly that a Dollar sell-off doesn’t make any sense against the Euro and Yen, whose economic and fiscal situations could hardly be characterized as healthy. “Against the majors, we’re pretty close to the end, if we haven’t already reached the end of a bear market in the dollar,” asserted one analyst. Given that the Dollar’s demise had all but been taken for granted, this reconsideration isn’t coming natural. Volatility has surged to a 3-month high, and investors are responding by moving funds back to the US. Among the majors, then, it looks like the Dollar is still the “least worst” currency.

Let me preface this post, by noting that I try to avoid writing about gold, since there are some many other excellent analysts out there writing about the subject. But when there is a such a strong overlap between gold and forex markets, well, I just can’t resist!

Recently, gold prices have collapsed at virtually the same rate as the Euro, with the result being a near-record high short-term correlation between EUR/USD and gold prices. This has caused no shortage of confusion among gold-watchers, which are accustomed to seeing the strongest (inverse) correlation with the US Dollar. This change is causing everyone to rethink some classically held assumptions about gold prices.

The foremost of which is that gold is chiefly a hedge against the Dollar, which is a symbol for inflation and erosion of value. [In fact, analysts argue that gold has little real purpose (besides a handful of trivial practical uses, such as jewelry), especially since holders of gold don't receive interest, there is little reason to own it other than as a store of value].  Thus, as the Dollar has declined over the last five years, gold has soared. Investors who are nervous about perennial budget deficits in the US and the skyrocketing national debt, have turned to Gold because of the belief  it will continue to hold its value even (or especially) if the US government is forced to devalue its debt by devaluing the Dollar. While this tenet underlies the gold/Dollar inverse relationship, the long and short of it is that investors typically buy gold when the Dollar falls, and vice versa. Thus, when the credit crisis struck and the Dollar rallied, gold prices fell, despite the fact that the US was now more likely to default on its debt.

In the last month, however, the Euro has taken center stage in dictating the price of gold. This is most likely because of the sovereign debt problems of certain EU countries. A not insignificant number of which well exceed the budget (not to exceed 3% of GDP per year) and debt (not to exceed 60% of GDP) limitations imposed on them by their membership in the EU. Recent credit rating downgrades have underscored an increasing likelihood of default, which has been duly noted both by the forex and gold markets. As the Euro has dropped (quite dramatically in fact), so has gold.

According to the current paradigm, this is not wholly unsurprising, since the Euro’s fall has naturally been mirrored by a rise in the Dollar. Thus, if you continue to look at gold prices in terms of the Dollar, it seems naturally that a rising Dollar is being accompanied by falling gold. On the other hand, the fact that the Dollar is suddenly rising has little to do with a change in US fundamentals, and instead reflects the fact that in forex, it’s impossible to short all currencies simultaneously, even if sometimes fundamentals would justify such an approach.

In other words, that certain EU member states are more likely to default on their respective debt obligations has limited bearing on whether the US will also default. [If anything, it increases the likelihood, since a default in the EU would likely send sovereign borrowing costs higher around the world, straining the ability of the US to continue borrowing]. By extension, the current drop in the price of gold is fundamentally irrational, especially when viewed relative to currency markets.  To borrow a hackneyed expression, perhaps it’s time for a paradigm shift.

As if forex traders didn’t have enough to worry about these days, now there is a new concern- that of sovereign debt default. The last couple months have witnessed a spate of minor episodes, all of which paint a picture of frightening cohesiveness about the state of sovereign finances, and the ability of countries to continue to finance and service their debt. As the economic recession moves into recovery (or at least, permanently distances itself from the prospect of depression), the markets will likely turn their gaze towards the long-term, with this issue looming large.

It’s difficult to know where to begin, since people have been talking about the perennial budget deficits of the US for many years. As a result of the economic downturn (stimulus programs and falling tax revenues), these budget deficits have taken on truly awesome proportions. The 2009 deficit came in at a record $1.4 Trillion, and the deficit in the fiscal year-to-date 2010 is close to $300 Billion.

The US, of course is far from alone, with virtually every nation (industrialized and developing, alike) operating in the red. Canada, Britain, Japan…even China – known for its fiscal prudence – are setting records with their budget shortfalls. As a result, “Moody’s…suggested that the countries’ triple-A ratings could face downgrades in coming years.” Greece’s sovereign debt was already downgraded, from AAA- to BBB+, while Spain has received a warning. Dubai is in technical default, but this is old news.

It’s not as if any of this is surprising, or even new. Greece, for example, was running 10% budget deficits during the height of the credit bubble. With the bursting of the bubble, however, sovereign fiscal problems have both been both exposed and exacerbated. If ever there was a time when national governments could be expected to get their fiscal houses in order, this is not it.

At this point, the markets appear to have resigned themselves to sky-high deficits for the immediate future, and have now begun to assess the implications rather than try to encourage governments to straighten out. Even though the US budget deficits and national debt are the highest in nominal terms, its Treasury bonds still remain the standard-bearer for global capital markets. Proving that point is that new Treasury issues are repeatedly oversubscribed, despite rock-bottom rates. “For every $1 of debt sold by the Treasury this year, investors put in bids for $2.59, up from $2.19 at this point in 2008.” Most importantly, the largest creditor – China – is headlining demand. Granted, the costs of insuring US debt (via credit default swaps) is rising, but investors generally remain cautiously optimistic about US finances.

The story on the other side of the Atlantic is not nearly as upbeat. Investors responded to the downgrade of Greece’s credit rating, by pushing up the yield on its debt by 50 basis points, raising the spread to 2.5% over comparable German sovereign bonds. Ireland, meanwhile, is projecting a budget deficit of 13.2% this year, and Austria is receiving scrutiny for its banks’ risky lending practices in Eastern Europe. “The question for Europe now is how much more solvent are countries like Italy, Portugal and Spain…Could it be that these are the regions where the next financial shoe is going to drop?” Asked one analyst.

The more important question is what would happen in the event of default, or even a spike in bond yields by a member of the EU. Technically, the treaty behind the European Monetary Union “contains a ‘no bail-out’ clause that prohibits one country from assuming the debts of another.” It seems hard to believe – from where I’m sitting at least – that other countries would sit by idly if one member began moving inexorably towards bankruptcy. Investors are certainly not blind to the notion of an implicit guarantee, which helps the weak at the expense of the whole. That could explain why Greek and Spanish bonds remain comparatively buoyant, while the Euro has suffered in recent sessions.

Then, there is the UK. Of all of the world’s major economies, the UK is arguably in the most precarious financial position, especially relative to its size. As one commentator lamented, “Indeed, the cost of our [UK] government borrowing – as measured by the interest rate – is rising so quickly that within a month it could be higher than Italy’s.” He goes on to discuss how inflating away the debt would be pointless, given the sophistication of investors and the fact that government liabilities are indexed to inflation, and hence would offset any gains from debt devaluation. He concludes: “The solution to today’s fiscal crisis is the same as it has always been: to cut spending, reduce the deficit and learn to live within our means.” Based on modern history, that seems pretty unlikely. Could Britain, then, become the first industrialized country to default on its debt? Forex markets: take note.

The Canadian Dollar has been one of the world’s top performers this year, especially relative to the Dollar. The Bank of Canada is less than thrilled about this distinction, which is why it takes advantage of nearly every opportunity to remind the markets that it will do everything in its power to prevent the Loonie from rising further. The markets are beginning to wonder, however, whether the BOC is actually prepared to put its money where its mouth is, if push comes to shove.

It’s impossible to say definitively whether the Canadian Dollar’s rise is justified by fundamentals. On the one hand, the ongoing economic recovery and commodities boom will specifically benefit resource-rich economies, such as Canada. It’s no surprise that Canada has been one of the most popular destinations for so-called “risk-averse” investment. Summarized one analyst, “It all revolves around the risk-aversion trade. Last week with equity markets and commodities selling off, we also saw the Canadian dollar selling off in that environment. Today the market settled down a little bit, so we were able to see the Canadian dollar claw back some of its losses.” In addition, it’s not as if the Loonie’s appreciation has been universal. Its gains are primarily against the US Dollar; in this sense, it has merely been subsumed into a larger trend, rather than having been singled out by forex traders.

On the other hand, the economy is forecast to contract in 2010, before returning to full capacity at some point in 2011. The Bank of Canada has flooded the market with currency, via its own version of quantitative easing. Non-commodity exports are stalling, and the government is running record budget deficits. The benchmark interest rate is only .25%, and the BOC has committed to holding it there until June 2010, barring any unforeseen developments. Thus, there is no “positive carry” to be earned from parking money in Canada.

In the context of forex intervention, this analysis is almost beside the point, since the BOC is clearly impervious to logic. Its decision to intervene at this point will probably be based less on economics and more on politics. You see, the Bank has left itself with very little wiggle room, should the Canadian Dollar continue to rise towards, or even past parity with the US Dollar. Its rhetoric has been fairly consistent; whether or not it actually has the wherewithal to intervene successfully (it probably doesn’t) it has conveyed to the markets that has both the means and the determination.

As a result, the BOC has pushed itself into a no-win situation. If the Loonie appreciates further and it doesn’t intervene, then it will have very little credibility going forward. If the Loonie rises and it does intervene, it risks incurring the wrath of the international community and wasting money towards a futile cause. “It’s hard for a modest-sized central bank such as Canada’s to flood the market with so much currency that it alters the balance of the world’s huge and complex foreign-exchange markets,” explained one economist.

The Bank’s best hope is that the markets continue to take its threats seriously and abstain from betting on the Loonie. For now, it looks like this is the case. “No one wants to go heavily long through the next few months in fear that the Bank of Canada does step in some way,” said one trader. In fact, the threat of intervention may have even brought speculators into the market to bet against the Loonie, having derived support from the last round of intervention (1998): “Traders took the bank’s willingness to intervene as an open invitation to bet heavily on the other side of the equation – knowing they had a big trading partner back-stopping their bet.”

It’s basically a giant game of chicken between the markets and the BOC. Who will blink first?

Equity markets are rising.  Crude oil is on a tear.  And the euro has everyone worried.  From European central bankers to the regional exporter, even to the U.S. traveler looking at an even more expensive European getaway, people are paying attention when it comes to the Euro.  And why not?  The currency has skyrocketed higher against the US dollar in recent months, making an impressive 20 percent gain since hitting the 1.2500 support back in February.  The scary thing is, the gains may be more to come as the current momentum seems to be bent on some key factors.

Economic Pessimism

Pure fundamental reasoning for the recent downturn has some in the market convinced that further dollar weakness is sure to come.  Although the European economy is down in the dumps as well, the masses seem to be focusing on the growing twin deficits currently held by the U.S.  The same concerns helped to support a higher Euro valuation just five years ago, when estimates had calculated a fiscal shortfall of $700 billion.  Chump change to what experts are now shuddering at when considering the plethora of programs that have been approved by the current administration.  Participants of the era will also scarcely remember falling employment as well.  All in all, current budget deficits will have to be funded by an increasing number of Treasury debt issuance, adding to an already bloated credit bill that is surely to decrease the confidence in U.S. based debt.

Carry Trade Bandwagon

It used to be the Japanese yen that was the butt of all carry trades in the last two to three years.  However, now it seems that the greenback is the funding currency of choice.  It makes perfect sense as the Federal Reserve has made significant cuts to the benchmark interest rates over the last 20 months in order to accommodate the underlying credit markets.  But at what cost?  With benchmark rates at the record low of 0.25 percent, traders will continue to sell the U.S. dollar short, helping out the Euro.  Making it even worse is the fact that U.S. rates aren’t expected to be raised until after all of the other G7 central banks have their turn.  Although expectations were hovering around a 40 percent chance of a 25 basis point increase by the Fed in the fourth quarter, those estimates have dwindled and placed a higher likelihood of that happening at the tailend of the first half 2010.

Dollar Doldrums: Central Banks Want Out

Additionally, central banks have played their part in rumors and threats as entities in all parts of the world have begun to talk the dollar down.  Earlier this summer, BRIC nations complained about their exposure to the dollar with Russia leading the way for a supranational currency or preferential trading of special drawing rights backed by the World Bank.  All of this talk of currency conversion has done nothing but increase already nascent speculation that a massive Euro conversion may happen as nations attempt to diversify out of U.S. dollar based assets.  This is of particular interest as three of the five aforementioned nations have risen up the currency reserve ladder (#1 China, #3 Russia, #5 India), with the fourth (#8 Brazil) not too far behind.  As long as there remains the underlying discomfort between the greenback and these nations, there will be a supported preference for anything other than U.S. currency.

The Monkey Wrench

Given the recent facts and trends, Euro strength looks to be here to stay.  Even if European Central Bank President Jean Claude Trichet begins his dutiful jawboning of the detrimental effects of a stronger currency, speculators are likely to keep pressing the currency higher.  The only caveat seems to be in the form of an earlier economic assessment of the Euro region.  Given the fact that interest rates remained relatively high in the area, economic growth may be slow to come.  The slower growth will likely keep European nations behind the current recovery and force policy makers to drag heels when it comes to raising rates in the near future.  Should this economic stalling actually take place, the current euro momentum may be placed in jeopardy.